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AMENDING CODES OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT TO IMPOSE 
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTION AND EXPENDITURE LIMITS ON 
JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS 
Hugh D. Spitzer and Phillip A. Talmadge  
Every judicial campaign year, millions of dollars pour into 
individual court races around the country. The bulk of that 
money is donated by lawyers, businesses, and others with 
financial interests in how judges, especially appellate judges, 
decide cases. United States Supreme Court rulings on political 
contributions and spending have hamstrung the ability of states 
to control largescale expenditures in judicial races. This essay 
reviews empirical research by political scientists who have 
documented the effect of large campaign donations on how 
judges decide cases and on the public’s perception of court 
impartiality. It describes how legislatures and courts have 
addressed (or failed to address) the flood of money into judicial 
races. The essay then proposes a number of actions that state 
courts and legislatures could take to control judicial campaign 
spending. First, we recommend that in jurisdictions with 
inadequate statutory judicial campaign controls, state supreme 
courts should act forcefully to impose strict caps on both direct 
and coordinated contributions to judicial campaigns, using the 
American Bar Association’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct, 
Rule 4.4(B)(1). Second, we suggest that state codes of judicial 
conduct should integrate the parallel mandatory disqualification 
mechanism in the ABA’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 
2.11(A). Next, we contend that legislatures have sufficient cause 
under a strict scrutiny test to protect judicial impartiality and 
the appearance of impartiality by limiting total judicial 
campaign committee expenditures and controlling independent 
expenditures by outside groups. Further, we assert that if 
legislatures fail to act, the courts themselves have sufficient 
inherent authority to impose those expenditure limits. Finally, we 
urge states to adopt public funding systems for judicial 
campaigns, and we argue that the need for judicial impartiality 
should provide legislatures with sufficient cause to adopt 
restrictions that would not be constitutionally acceptable in non-
judicial campaigns. 
Magna Carta, 1215, para. 40: “To no one will 
we sell, to no one deny or delay right or justice.” 
INTRODUCTION 
VERY judicial election year, millions of dollars pour into individual 
court races around the country. The Brennan Center at New York 
University’s School of Law reports that outside groups spent an 
E 
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estimated $19.4 million on judicial campaign television ads in the 2015-
16 cycle, a 44 percent increase over the 2011-12 period.1 Much of that 
money comes from independent groups whose funders are difficult to 
identify.2 As of 2013, only a dozen states appointed their highest 
appellate courts with no electoral participation.3 Fifteen used nonpartisan 
elections, seven carried out partisan elections, and the others either use 
some form of appointment plus a retention election or an open 
nonpartisan election.4 States with partisan elections for judgeships 
typically witness the largest judicial campaign expenditures.5 
Some political scientists observe that massive judicial campaign 
spending increases voter interest and participation,6 which would 
                                                                                                                        
 1 Spending By Outside Groups in Judicial Races Hits Record High, Se-
cret Money Domi-
nates, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Nov. 15, 2016), https://www.brennancenter.or
g/press-release/spending-outside-groups-judicial-races-hits-record-high-secret-
money-dominates [https://perma.cc/X5LE-9TDZ]. For an analysis of where 
money is concentrated in judicial elections, and why, see Chris W. Bonneau, 
What Price Justice(s)? Understanding Campaign Spending in State Supreme 
Court Elections, 5 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 107 (2005). 
 2 Paul Blumenthal, This Dark Money Group Is Spending Big on Judi-
cial Races, And 
No One Knows Why, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 3, 2016), http://www.huffingtonp
ost.com/entry/dark-money-judicial-races-center-for-individual-
freedom_us_581b5234e4b0c43e6c1e7 
40d [https://perma.cc/6KJB-U96Z]. 
 3 MELINDA GANN HALL, ATTACKING JUDGES: HOW CAMPAIGN 
ADVERTISING INFLUENCES STATE SUPREME COURT ELECTIONS 37 (2015). For 
state-by-state summaries of judicial selection, see Methods of Judicial Selection, 
NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., 
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/methods/selection_of_judges.
cfm?state= [https://perma.cc/G7HG-5FT4] (last visited Aug. 1, 2017) [hereinaf-
ter Methods of Judicial Selection]; Judicial Selection in the States: Overview, 
BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/Judicial_selection_in_the_states [https://perma.cc/G8QC-
BCXH]. 
 4 Methods of Judicial Selection, supra note 3. 
 5 Linda Casey, Courting Donors: Money in Judicial Elections, 2011 
and 2012, NAT’L 
INST. ON MONEY IN ST. POL. (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.followthemoney.org/r
esearch/institute-reports/courting-donors-money-in-judicial-elections-2011-and-
2012/ [https://perma.cc/2CXD-78TY]. 
 6 HALL, supra note 3, at 4, 161. In her book, Hall focuses on negative 
campaign advertising, and concludes “that attack airings mobilize voters in non-
partisan state supreme court elections.” HALL, supra note 3, at 161. See also 
Lawrence Baum & David Klein, Voter Responses to High-Visibility Judicial 
Campaigns, in RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL, AND 
LEGAL STAKES OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 140, 161 (Matthew J. Streb ed., 2007); 
Chris W. Bonneau & Matthew J. Streb, White Noise: The Unrealized Effects of 
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White on Judicial Elections, 32 JUST. SYS. J. 
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normally be a cause for celebration. Other political scientists, as well as 
many judges, lawyers and legal academics, focus on the sinister side of 
court campaign spending—particularly expenditures to attack sitting 
judges viewed as unfriendly to special interest groups or to elect 
candidates seen as friendlier to those groups. The main concerns are that 
large judicial campaign contributions will influence how judges decide 
cases (which happens, according to researchers7), and that the public’s 
confidence in the legal system will decline because people will believe 
that big money buys judicial outcomes and undermines perceptions of 
judicial fairness and legitimacy (which political scientists have also 
documented8). 
Many state legislatures have enacted statutes limiting individual and 
corporate contributions to judicial campaigns, but eight states that use 
judicial elections or retention votes have little or no controls on 
individual or PAC contributions to campaign committees.9 Further, the 
reach of contribution and spending limits has been constrained by First 
Amendment cases such as Republican Party of Minnesota v. White10 and 
Citizens United v. FEC.11 
                                                                                                                        
247, 261–63 (2011); Melinda Gann Hall & Chris W. Bonneau, Does Money Buy 
Voters? Campaign Spending and Citizen Participation in State Supreme Court 
Elections (Feb. 1, 2007), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=1009671 
[https://perma.cc/J8KB-DJGV]. 
 7 See Damon M. Cann, Campaign Contributions and Judicial Behav-
ior, 23 AM. REV. POL. 261 (2002); Morgan L.W. Hazelton et al., Does Public 
Financing Affect Judicial Behavior? Evidence From the North Carolina Su-
preme Court, 44 AM. POL. RES. 587 (2016); Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. 
Shepherd, Partisanship in State Supreme Courts: The Empirical Relationship 
between Party Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decision Making, 44 J. 
LEGAL STUD. S161 (2015); Chris W. Bonneau & Damon M. Cann, The Effect of 
Campaign Contributions on Judicial Decisionmaking (Feb. 4, 2009), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1337668 
[https://perma.cc/7FAD-ZKJJ]. Interestingly, in those states with partisan judi-
cial elections, the relationship between political party contributions and partisan 
voting appears to be stronger for Republican judges than for Democrats. Mi-
chael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, Partisanship in State Supreme Courts: 
The Empirical Relationship between Party Campaign Contributions and Judi-
cial Decision Making, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. S161 (2015). 
 8 James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Judicial Impartiality, Cam-
paign Contributions, and Recusals: Results from a National Survey, 10 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 76 (2013). 
 9 Judicial Campaigns and Elections, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., 
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/campaigns_and_elections/ca
mpaign_financing.cfm?state [https://perma.cc/R9VB-25KV] (last visited July 
28, 2017). 
 10 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
 11 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
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Part II of this essay describes United States Supreme Court rulings 
that have reduced state control over largescale spending in court races, as 
well as more recent decisions that provide hope for new parameters on 
judicial campaign contributions—particularly limits set by the courts 
themselves through codes of judicial conduct. Part III reviews empirical 
research by political scientists who have documented the effect of large 
campaign donations on how judges decide cases and on the public’s 
perception of court impartiality. Part IV describes how legislatures and 
courts have addressed (or not addressed) the flood of money into judicial 
races. Part V proposes a package of actions by state courts and 
legislatures to control spending in judicial elections. First, we 
recommend that in jurisdictions with inadequate statutory judicial 
campaign controls, state supreme courts should act forcefully to impose 
strict caps on both direct and coordinated contributions to judicial 
campaigns, using the mechanism suggested by the American Bar 
Association’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 4.4(B)(1).12 
Second, state codes of judicial conduct should integrate the parallel 
mandatory disqualification mechanism in the ABA’s Model Code of 
Judicial Conduct, Rule 2.11(A). Third, we contend that legislatures have 
sufficient cause under a strict scrutiny test to protect judicial impartiality 
and the appearance of impartiality by limiting total judicial campaign 
committee expenditures and controlling independent expenditures by 
outside groups. And, if legislatures fail to act, we argue that the courts 
have sufficient inherent authority to impose those expenditure limits. 
Finally, we urge states to adopt public funding systems for judicial 
campaigns, and we similarly argue that the need for judicial impartiality 
should provide legislatures with sufficient cause to adopt restrictions that 
would not be constitutionally acceptable in non-judicial campaigns.13 
We are not proposing that states abandon the election of judges when 
they choose to do so—that is beyond the scope of this article, and it is an 
issue on which the authors hold differing views. But when jurisdictions 
give a role to the voters in the selection or retention of judgeships, we 
believe that strong protections must be put in place to help ensure the 
continued independence and impartiality of the judicial branch. 
I. BACKGROUND: A WINDING ROAD OF CASES 
The explosion of cash in judicial elections—and what might be done 
about it—must be analyzed in the context of a number of Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                        
 12 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.4(B)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 
2016) [hereinafter MODEL CODE]. 
 13 As evident from many of the academic articles cited in this essay as 
well as American Bar Association proposals, calls for greater controls on spend-
ing in judicial elections are nothing new. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Preserv-
ing an Independent Judiciary: The Need for Contribution and Expenditure Lim-
its in Judicial Elections, 74 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 133 (1998). 
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and circuit court cases that can be traced back to Buckley v. Valeo14 in 
1976. The Buckley per curiam opinion relied on the First Amendment 
and struck down several provisions the Federal Election Campaign Act 
of 1971,15 including caps on spending by campaigns, individuals, and 
independent groups in federal elections.16 At the same time, Buckley up-
held provisions limiting the size of individual and political committee 
contributions to campaigns,17 as well as mandatory campaign disclo-
sures18 and voluntary public funding programs.19 In its opinion, the 
Buckley court used a “closely drawn” scrutiny approach.20 Yet the Court 
found that annual dollar limits on individual and committee contribu-
tions constituted the statute’s “primary weapons against the reality or 
appearance of improper influence stemming from the dependence of 
candidates on large campaign contributions”21 and that the contribution 
ceilings served “the basic governmental interest in safeguarding the in-
tegrity of the electoral process without directly impinging upon the rights 
of individual citizens and candidates to engage in political debate and 
discussion.”22 At the same time, the Court found “that the government 
interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption” were 
inadequate to justify the statute’s ceiling on independent expenditures,23 
asserting that independent advocacy did not “presently appear to pose 
dangers of real or apparent corruption comparable to those identified 
with large campaign contributions”24 and that the “absence of prear-
rangement and coordination of an expenditure with the candidate or his 
agent not only undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate, 
but also alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid 
pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate.”25 The Court 
also ruled that no government interest—at least none proposed to it—
was sufficient to justify the restrictions on total campaign expenditures, 
and that the contribution caps and disclosure requirements appeared to 
be sufficient.26 The Buckley court did not consider the statute’s ban on 
corporate independent expenditures. But in 2003, Citizens United v. Fed-
                                                                                                                        
 14 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 15 Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92–225, 86 
Stat. 3 (1972) (codified at 52 U.S.C. § 30101–30146). 
 16 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39–51. 
 17 Id. at 26–36. 
 18 Id. at 60–61. 
 19 Id. at 86. 
 20 Id. at 25; se also, McConnell v. Federal Elections Commission, 540 
U.S. 93, 94 (2003) (Justice Stevens, for the Court, describes Buckley as having 
applied a “‘closely drawn’ scrutiny” test. 
 21 Id. at 58. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. at 44. 
 24 Id. at 46 (emphasis added). 
 25 Id. at 47. 
 26 Id. at 55. 
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eral Election Commission27 held that laws burdening political speech 
were subject to strict scrutiny28 and that restrictions could not suppress 
political speech based on a speaker’s corporate identity, and that “[n]o 
sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech of 
nonprofit or for-profit corporations.” 29 More recently, in McCutcheon v. 
Federal Election Commission,30 Chief Justice Roberts held for a 5-4 ma-
jority that statutory aggregate limits on how much a donor may contrib-
ute in total to all political candidates or committees violated the First 
Amendment. The aggregate limit also had not been addressed in Buckley 
v. Valeo. Roberts wrote that the Court had previously “identified only 
one legitimate governmental interest for restricting campaign finances: 
preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption.”31 He asserted: 
“In assessing the First Amendment interests at stake, the proper focus is 
on an individual’s right to engage in political speech, not a collective 
conception of the public good.”32 McCutcheon did not affect individual 
contribution limits to a single campaign—just the aggregate cap on all 
contributions in a campaign cycle. But Buckley, Citizens United and their 
progeny such as McCutcheon, paved the way for the increase in cam-
paign spending nationally, including special interest spending in judicial 
elections.33 
Other Supreme Court cases have focused on the First Amendment in 
the judicial campaign context, including decisions relating to campaign-
ing, fund-raising and expenditures. The campaign practices case that 
surprised and perturbed many in the judiciary34 and academia35 was Re-
                                                                                                                        
 27 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 28 Id. at 340. 
 29 Id. at 365. 
 30 McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014). 
 31 Id. at 1438. 
 32 Id. 
 33 See, e.g., Debra Erenberg & Matt Berg, The Dark Night Rises: The 
Growing Role of Independent Expenditures in Judicial Elections after Citizens 
United, 49 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 501 (2013); Norman L. Greene, How Great is 
America’s Tolerance for Judicial Bias? An Inquiry into the Supreme Court’s 
Decisions in Caperton and Citizens United, Their Implications for Judicial 
Elections, and Their Effect on the Rule of Law in the United States, 112 W. VA. 
L. REV. 873 (2010); Nicholas LaRow, Open Floodgates? Independent Spending 
in State Supreme Court Elections after Citizens United, 100 JUDICATURE 47 
(2016) (demonstrating an immediate increase in expenditures in state supreme 
court races after Citizens United). But see Bonneau & Streb, supra note 6, at 
260–61, in which the authors conclude that the cost of judicial election cam-
paigns have not increased since White in a statistically significant way. 
 34 See, e.g., Robert H. Alsdorf, The Sound of Silence: Thoughts of a Sit-
ting Judge on the Problem of Free Speech and the Judiciary in a Democracy, 30 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 197 (2003); American Judicature Society, The Legacy of 
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White: Judicial Independence, Judicial Selec-
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publican Party of Minnesota v. White36 in 2002. In White, Justice Anto-
nin Scalia wrote the Court’s opinion in a 5-4 decision that the Minnesota 
Code of Judicial Conduct’s “Announce Clause”37 banning judges and 
judicial candidates from announcing their views on disputed legal or po-
litical issues, violated judicial candidates’ First Amendment rights. Scalia 
reasoned that announcing one’s views “covers much more than promis-
ing to decide an issue a particular way.”38 Applying a strict scrutiny 
standard. Scalia concluded that the Announce Clause was not narrowly 
tailored to serve impartiality or its appearance, and he narrowed the con-
cept of “impartiality” to bias for or against particular parties to a pro-
ceeding—not for or against particular issues.39 Scalia wrote that while 
there might be an interest in “impartiality” in the broader sense of lack of 
a predisposition on a particular topic, that was not a compelling state in-
terest.40 He noted: “A judge's lack of predisposition regarding the rele-
vant legal issues in a case has never been thought a necessary component 
of equal justice, and with good reason. For one thing, it is virtually im-
possible to find a judge who does not have preconceptions about the 
                                                                                                                        
tion, and the First Amendment in the Post-White Era, 91 JUDICATURE 135 
(2007). 
 35 See, e.g., Dale A. Riedel, Losing Faith in the System: Unfettered Po-
litical Speech of Judicial Candidates Fails to Assure an Openminded Judiciary 
after Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 421 
(2003); Roy A. Schotland, Republican Party of Minnesota v. White: Should 
Judges be More Like Politicians? 41 JUDGES’ J. 7 (2002); Wendy R. Weiser, 
Regulating Judges’ Political Activity after White, 68 ALB. L. REV. 651 (2005). 
 36 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
 37 Former Canon 5(A)(3)(d) of the Minn. Code of Judicial Conduct 
(2000) provided that a candidate for judicial office must not “announce his or 
her views on disputed legal or political issues.” For a detailed discussion of the 
history and controversy of Minnesota’s “Announce Clause,” see Plymouth Nel-
son, Don't Rock the Boat: Minnesota’s Canon 5 Keeps Incumbents High and 
Dry While Voters Flounder in a Sea of Ignorance, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
1607, 1625–29 (2002). Since the American Bar Association’s promulgation of a 
revised Model Code of Judicial Conduct in 2007, a number of states, including 
Minnesota, have revised their codes of judicial conduct. The ABA Model Code 
of Judicial Conduct, as well as Minnesota’s, now address campaign activity at 
Canon 4. For a brief history of the development of the ABA Model Code in light 
of the Supreme Court’s decision in White, see STEPHEN GILLERS, ROY D. 
SIMON, ANDREW M. PERLMAN & JOHN STEELE, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: 
STATUTES & STANDARDS 691–94 (2015). For a description of the state-by-state 
adoption of the American Bar Association’s 2007 revisions to the Model Code 
of Judicial Conduct, see State Adoption of Revised Model Code of Judi-
cial Conduct, A.B.A., CTR. FOR PROF’L RESP., http://www.americanbar.org/grou
ps/professional_responsibility/resources/judicial_ethics_regulation/map.html [ht
tps://perma.cc/V8DU-LJDY].  
 38 White, 536 U.S. at 770. 
 39 Id. at 776. 
 40 Id. at 777. 
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law.”41 Justice O’Connor, a former state judge, concurred with a glum 
assessment that “the very practice of electing judges undermines” the 
state interest in an impartial judiciary, noting that “[e]lected judges can-
not help being aware that if the public is not satisfied with the outcome 
of a particular case, it could hurt their reelection prospects.”42 Justice 
Steven’s dissent vigorously disagreed with the notion that judicial candi-
dates should have the same freedom to express themselves as candidates 
for political office,43 and also with the concept of narrowing “impartiali-
ty” to a predisposition towards a specific party.44 Justice Ginsburg also 
dissented, emphasizing that “judges perform a function fundamentally 
different from that of the people’s elected representatives,”45 and that 
Minnesota could further “its interest in judicial integrity through this 
precisely targeted speech restriction.”46 
On the other hand, a majority of the Supreme Court certainly did ap-
pear concerned about impartiality of judges when it involved a specific 
company’s possible “purchase” of an individual state supreme court 
judge when that company had a high stakes case in front of that court. 
Seven years after White, the Court in Caperton v. Massey Coal47 held 
that gigantic campaign contributions and independent expenditures (al-
most $3 million) by the chair of Massey Coal to unseat a sitting justice 
on the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals while Massey Coal was 
appealing a $50 million judgment to that court, required the disqualifica-
tion of the successful candidate backed by Massey Coal. Don Blanken-
ship, chair and CEO of Massey Coal, had contributed the $1,000 statuto-
ry maximum to the campaign committee of Brent Benjamin, who was 
running to unseat the sitting Justice Warren McGraw.48 But Blankenship 
also gave almost $2.5 million to a political organization opposed to 
McGraw, and separately spent $500,000 on independent expenditures in 
support of the challenger, Benjamin.49 Benjamin was elected, but de-
clined to recuse himself from the appeal in a $50 million commercial 
lawsuit against Massey Coal. That case was decided 3-2, and the plaintiff 
appealed to the Supreme Court because Benjamin had declined to recuse 
himself.50 Writing for a 5-4 majority, Justice Anthony Kennedy noted 
that an opinion poll indicated that 67% of West Virginians believed that 
the newly-elected Justice Benjamin could not be impartial in the case.51 
                                                                                                                        
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. at 788. 
 43 Id. at 797. 
 44 Id. at 800. 
 45 Id. at 803. 
 46 Id. at 804. 
 47 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal, Inc., 556 U.S. 868 (2009). 
 48 Id. at 873. 
 49 Id.  
 50 Id. at 873–76. 
 51 Id. at 875. 
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Kennedy emphasized that due process requires a fair tribunal,52 and con-
cluded that in this “exceptional case” there was “a serious risk of actual 
bias . . . when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a 
significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the 
case by raising funds or directing the judge’s election campaign when 
the case was pending or imminent.53 He ruled that the case must be re-
versed because of Justice Benjamin’s refusal to recuse himself.54 Chief 
Justice Roberts wrote a lively dissent, arguing that the Due Process 
Clause does not mandate recusal based on a mere “probability of bias.”55 
He concluded that Justice Kennedy had failed to articulate a workable 
standard for recusals, and listed 40 “fundamental questions” the majority 
opinion had, in his view, failed to address.56 
But a year after Caperton, Chief Justice Roberts appeared much 
more sympathetic to court controls on judicial candidates. In Williams-
Yulee v. the Florida Bar,57 Roberts authored an opinion upholding, 
against a First Amendment challenge, a Florida Code of Judicial Con-
duct rule that prohibited judicial candidates from personally soliciting 
funds. Importantly, Roberts wrote an opinion that in marked contrast to 
White, emphasized: “A State’s interest in preserving public confidence in 
the integrity of its judiciary extends beyond its interest in preventing the 
appearance of corruption in legislative and executive elections.58 He not-
ed: 59 
“Judges are not politicians, even when they come to the 
bench by way of the ballot. And a State’s decision to 
elect its judiciary does not compel it to treat judicial 
candidates like campaigners for political office. A State 
may assure its people that judges will apply the law 
without fear or favor—and without having personally 
asked anyone for money.” 
Roberts then highlighted the importance of Florida’s Code of Judi-
cial Conduct in preserving the integrity and independence of the judici-
ary.60 He pointed out the strong temptations that judges would be faced 
when deciding cases in which campaign donors known to them were 
lawyers or litigants appearing before them,61 and openly worried that 
litigants might believe it necessary to search for attorneys who had made 
                                                                                                                        
 52 Id. at 876.  
 53 Id. at 884. 
 54 Id. at 889–90. 
 55 Id. at 890–91. 
 56 Id. at 893–98. 
 57 Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015). 
 58 Id. at 1667. 
 59 Id. at 1662. 
 60 Id. at 1662–63, 1666. 
 61 Id. at 1667. 
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significant campaign donations to individual judges.62 Applying a strict 
scrutiny test, he concluded that the Code’s restriction on direct solicita-
tion by judicial candidates “advances the State’s compelling interest in 
preserving public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary,” and it did 
so through “means narrowly tailored to avoid unnecessarily abridging 
speech.”63 
Williams-Yulee is important because it suggests that Chief Justice 
Roberts firmly believes that elected judges are different from elected 
politicians, that the First Amendment applies to judges differently than to 
other people, and that codes of judicial conduct are legitimate tools to 
protect judicial integrity and public confidence in the judiciary. Accord-
ingly, he might be willing to sustain more vigorous state court actions to 
preserve their independence though canons that constrain judicial cam-
paign money in ways that would not be acceptable restrictions when ap-
plied to legislative or executive elections. As we next discuss, social sci-
ence research suggests that large donations for and against judicial 
candidates appear to have a material effect on both the appearance and 
the actuality of an impartial judiciary. 
II. THE IMPACT OF MONEY ON JUDGES’ DECISIONS AND PUBLIC 
PERCEPTIONS OF IMPARTIALITY.  
A. Money Appears to Talk . . . 
Whether or not the individual judges who receive large campaign 
donations are fully conscious of the resulting impact on their decisions, 
social scientists have solid evidence that judicial behavior is materially 
affected by who is contributing—and by how much. This suggests that 
large campaign contributions pose a real danger to an impartial judiciary, 
and not just a perceived problem. 
Political scientists Chris W. Bonneau of the University of Pittsburgh 
and Damon M. Cann of Utah State University have jointly and separate-
ly published several papers linking judicial campaign contributions to 
how judges rule from the bench. In a 2009 paper, Bonneau and Cann 
concluded that campaign contributions appeared to have a particular ef-
fect on the outcome of cases in states in which judges are elected in par-
tisan contests.64 Law professors Michael S. Kang and Joanna Shepherd 
found in one study an unsurprising relationship between political party 
contributions and judicial stance, particularly with respect to Republican 
judges.65 In another paper, Kang and Shepherd showed that “the more 
                                                                                                                        
 62 Id. at 1668. 
 63 In concurring opinions, Justices Breyer and Ginsburg rejected the 
strict scrutiny test in this context. Id. at 1673–75. 
 64 Bonneau & Cann, supra note 7, at 19. 
 65 Kang & Shepherd, supra note 7, at S181; see also Michael S. Kang 
& Joanna M. Shepherd, The Partisan Price of Justice: An Empirical Analysis of 
Campaign contributions and Judicial Decisions, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 69, 103–05 
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TV ads aired during state supreme court judicial elections in a state, the 
less likely justices are to vote in favor of criminal defendants.”66 In an 
article focusing on the Georgia Supreme Court, Cann was also able to 
correlate campaign contributions with judges’ decisions, a phenomenon 
suggesting “that independence of the judiciary may be seriously com-
promised in states that use competitive elections to select judges.”67  
Many studies demonstrate correlation without showing causation,68 
and correlations between contributors and judicial decisions can often be 
explained by the observation that judicial campaign donors are likely to 
direct their money toward candidates whose general views they prefer. 
But a 2016 study by a team of political scientists led by St. Louis Uni-
versity’s Morgan Hazelton compared rulings by supreme court justices 
in North Carolina who joined a public financing mechanism with those 
who did not. They concluded that after opting into public financing, jus-
tices “became relatively less favorable toward attorney donors” and that 
“the justices who opted into the system become more ideologically mod-
erate relative to nonparticipating justices.”69 This study, with its built-in 
control group of justices who continued to rely on private campaign 
funding, provides solid evidence that whether or not the judges them-
selves perceive it, funding sources influence voting patterns on the 
bench. Hazelton and her colleagues concluded that “donors do in fact 
                                                                                                                        
(2011) (in which the authors demonstrate that competitive elections produce 
judges whose opinions are more “pro-business” than judges selected and con-
firmed through a retention method, and suggest a link between campaign con-
tributions and judicial decision-making.). 
 66 Joanna Shepherd & Michael S. Kang, Skewed Justice: Citizens Unit-
ed, Television Advertising and State Supreme Court Justices’ Decisions in Crim-
inal Cases, AM. CONST. SOC’Y FOR L. & POL’Y, 2014, https://skewedjustice.org/ 
[https://perma.cc/2C2W-9L82].  
 67 Damon M. Cann, Justice for Sale? Campaign Contributions and Ju-
dicial Decision Making (2006), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=991364 
[https://perma.cc/FUQ3-ZUCX]. On the other hand, Cann concluded in a 2002 
paper that in the 1998 term of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, there was no cor-
relation between lawyers’ donations to specific justices and how those jurists 
ruled in cases argued by the contributing lawyers. Damon M. Cann, Campaign 
Contributions and Judicial Behavior, 23 AM. REV. POL. 261 (2002). 
 68 A study of state supreme court campaigns from 1993 to 1998, by The 
Plain Dealer newspaper in Ohio, concluded that two-thirds of the time the court 
ruled in favor of clients represented by the lawyers who contributed the most to 
the justices’ campaigns. Charles G. Geyh, Publicly Financing Judicial Elec-
tions: An Overview, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1467, 1470 (2001). Geyh pointed out 
that there may be “perfectly innocuous explanations” for the correlation be-
tween campaign donations and success. But he noted that even “if the reality of 
influence can be rebutted . . . appearance problems remain.” Id. 
 69 Morgan L. W. Hazelton, Jacob M. Montgomery, & Brendan Nyhan, 
Does Public Financing Affect Judicial Behavior? Evidence from the North Car-
olina Supreme Court, 44 AM. POL. RES. 587, 608 (2016).  
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have distorting influence on judicial decision making.”70 This conclusion 
is consistent with similar studies, such as one by Joanna Shepherd, that 
concluded that when judges are serving in their last terms prior to man-
datory retirement, their voting patterns change and they become much 
less business-oriented in their decisions.71 
B.  . . . And the Voters are Not the Least Bit Surprised 
While there is evidence that campaign contributions affect judges’ 
impartiality, there is even more evidence that the public believes cam-
paign donations directly influence judicial decision-making. Voters seem 
to think this is true even where judges are in fact immune to the subtle 
pressures of campaign contributions and the interest groups making 
them. James Sample and David Pozen have summarized data suggesting 
that more than 70 percent of Americans believe that campaign contribu-
tions have some impact on judicial decisions.72 In a 2013 study,73 politi-
cal scientists James Gibson and Gregory Caldeira found that judges who 
turn down contributions are perceived as fairer, and that the public seems 
to believe that the size of a campaign contribution makes less difference 
than the fact that a judge’s campaign accepts money from an interest 
group or litigant at all. The authors suggest that their “most important 
findings are that campaign contributions and support can indeed create 
perceptions of conflicts of interest and thereby weaken the legitimacy of 
state courts”74 and that in “a post-Citizens United world, these findings . . 
. point to significant threats to the legitimacy of elected state courts.”75 A 
2011 poll of North Carolina voters by the advocacy group Justice at 
Stake, found that 83% of those questioned thought that campaign contri-
butions either greatly (43%) or somewhat (40%) influence the rulings 
judges make.76 
                                                                                                                        
 70 Id. at 608–09. 
 71 Joanna M. Shepherd, The Influence of Retention Politics on Judges’ 
Voting, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 169, 190 (2009). 
 72 James Sample & David E. Pozen, Making Judicial Recusal More 
Rigorous, 46 JUDGES’ J. 17 (2007). 
 73 Gibson & Caldeira, supra note 8. 
 74 Id. at 78. 
 75 Id. at 76. One of the most interesting findings by Gibson and Caldei-
ra is that “about one-third of the American people . . . accept a fairly politicized 
judiciary” and that this represents “a card-core minority of Americans who are 
unfazed by possible conflicts of interest.” Id. at 96. 
 76 North Carolina Registered Voter Survey Ref. 2011-165, 20/20 In-
sight, LLC, JUSTICE AT STAKE 
(2011), http://www.justiceatstake.org/file.cfm/media/cms/q165__freq_limited_r
elease_9E72F4684EB8B.pdf [https://perma.cc/2FED-S542]. A similar 2010 poll 
in West Virginia yielded similar results. Anzalone Liszt Research, Inc., Justice 
at Stake-West Virginia 2010,JUSTICE AT 
STAKE  (2010), http://www.justiceatstake.org/media/cms/West_Virginia_Poll_R
esults_674E634FDB13F.pdf [https://perma.cc/4X5L-AMT7]. 
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The bottom line is that impartiality, and the appearance of impartiali-
ty, are distinct phenomena—both important to a functioning independent 
judiciary. And both are directly affected by judicial campaign contribu-
tions. So next we turn to what the states and the state courts are (or are 
not) doing about it. 
III. WHAT STATES ARE (AND AREN’T) DOING ABOUT JUDICIAL 
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS AND EXPENDITURES. 
States in which voters play a role in selecting or retaining judges 
vary significantly in whether and how they address the level of money 
directed at the judicial selection process. Many states (but by no means 
all) have statutes limiting individual and corporate donations to judicial 
campaigns. The American Bar Association has not succeeded in its at-
tempt to have contribution caps inserted in codes of judicial conduct, but 
many judicial conduct codes do include disqualification language with 
alternate approaches to addressing bias or perceived bias in cases involv-
ing large contributors. Tight recusal or disqualification77 rules are one 
path. And a few jurisdictions have public financing for judgeship elec-
tions. Because of Buckley v. Valeo,78 the states currently are not attempt-
ing mandatory caps on total expenditures by judicial candidate’s cam-
paign committees or by independent groups. This section discusses the 
status of these various methods of reducing campaign donations that af-
fect the independence of judges and how the public views that independ-
ence. 
  
                                                                                                                        
 77 Historically, the term “recusal” was used to connote a judge’s volun-
tary decision to stand down from a case, while “disqualification” was mandato-
ry. However, the leading treatise on the topic concludes that the terms are used 
interchangeably today and are frequently seen as being synonymous. RICHARD 
E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF 
JUDGES 3–4 (2d ed. 2007). 
 78 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
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A. Statutory Limits on Individual and Organizational Contributions 
Statutory caps on donations to judicial elections not only vary from 
state to state, but within states based on whether the position is statewide 
or local, appellate or trial court, or a specialty court such as the probate 
or family bench. One can appreciate the variety by reviewing the statuto-
ry restrictions on contributions to supreme court races. Based on a re-
view of official websites and statutes79 for the 37 states where voters 
play a role in selecting supreme court justices,80 as of 2017, individuals 
in three states are restricted to campaign donations of $1,000 or less per 
campaign per election cycle, individuals in seven states may contribute 
amounts more than $1,000 but less than $5,000, individuals in 17 states 
are subject to contribution limits above $5,000, and in 10 states there are 
no individual contribution limits at all. This is summarized on the fol-
lowing table: 
TABLE 1 
STATE LIMITS ON STATE SUPREME COURT CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS 
BY INDIVIDUALS DURING AN ELECTION CYCLE 
Up to $1,000 
>  $1,000 but  
<  $5,000 
$5,000 + No limits 
AK,MT, WV CO*, KY, 
MN, SD, TN, 
WA, WY 
AZ, AR, FL, 
GA, ID, IL, LA, 
MI, MS, MO, 
NV, NM, NC, 
OH, OK, TX, WI 
AL, CA, IN, 
IA, KS, NE,* 
ND, OR, PA, UT 
 
* Colorado’s Code of Judicial Conduct Rules 4.2 and 4.3, and Nebraska’s 
Court Rule §5-3-4.4, ban any judicial campaign activity unless a judge encoun-
ters “active opposition” in a retention election, and then statutory statewide can-
didate contribution rules apply. 
 
The size of the states’ individual campaign contribution limits does 
not appear to correlate to whether those states select justices through par-
                                                                                                                        
 79 The authors reviewed official state campaign disclosure websites and 
statutes for each state at the time of the article’s publishing. A website with 
summary data that is not up to date) is Ballotpedia, 
https://ballotpedia.org/Judicial_elections [https://perma.cc/RT8U-XVKQ] (then, 
for each state, choose the state and then click on “Campaign Finance Require-
ments for [name of state] Judicial Elections.”). Also see the out-of-date website 
originally compiled by the American Judicature Society, and now available 
through the National Center for State 
Courts, at: http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/campaigns_and_el
ections/campaign_financing.cfm?state [https://perma.cc/7BYY-V7VZ]. 
 80 Although some of these states provide for the election of some lower 
court judges, members of the supreme courts in the following thirteen states are 
appointed by governors and/or legislatures, with no role for the voters: Connect-
icut, Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont and Virginia. 
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tisan elections, non-partisan elections, or some type of appointment-plus-
retention system. It is likely that the limit amounts are driven by local 
history, custom, and political factors. 
Statutory limits on supreme court campaign contributions by organi-
zations is more complicated because many states have different limits, or 
contribution prohibitions, with respect to political action committees, 
political parties, corporations,81 unions, and other entities. However, 
lumping all types of organizations together, a general picture of the dis-
tribution of state limits on entity contributions to judicial campaigns 
emerges: 
TABLE 2 
STATE LIMITS ON STATE SUPREME CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS 
BY ORGANIZATIONS DURING AN ELECTION CYCLE 
Up to $1,000 
>  $1,000 but 
<  $5,000 
$5,000 + No limits 
AK*, AZ*,  
MS, MT*, WV* 
CO*, KY*, 
MN*, SD, WA, 
WY* 
AR*, FL, 
GA, ID, IN, IL, 
LA, MI*, MO*, 
NM, NV, NC*, 
OH, OK, TN, 
TX,* WI* 
AL, CA, 
IA*, KS, NE, 
ND*, OR, PA*, 
UT 
* Applies to certain campaign committees and/or PACs, but corporations 
prohibited from contributing directly to campaigns. See Table 1 note regarding 
Colorado and Nebraska. 
 
There are only modest differences between the donation limits for 
individuals and for organizations. It should be noted that slightly more 
states put organizations in the lowest limit category than those states do 
for individual donors. Fewer states appear in the second category of do-
nation amounts. Fewer states allow organizations to make unlimited con-
tributions, although some states permit very large organizational dona-
tions—up to $55,400 for PACs in Illinois, and $537,100 for political 
parties in Ohio. 
Similar to individual contribution limits, there does not appear to be 
an immediately apparent correlation between maximum limits and the 
method of supreme court selection. However, notwithstanding the state-
                                                                                                                        
 81 Although statutes in a number of states purport to ban corporate con-
tributions, in many jurisdictions corporations may contribute indirectly through 
committees or PACs. Further, bans on corporate political contributions are sub-
ject to attack on both equal protection and free speech grounds, particularly 
since Citizens United.  In Protect My Check v. Dilger, 176 F. Supp. 3d 685, 704 
(E.D. Ky. 2016), a federal district court ruled, on equal protection grounds, that 
a ban on corporate contributions to political campaigns of all types was uncon-
stitutional to the extent that the ban on corporate contributions did not apply 
equally to unions and LLCs. See also, Dallman v. Ritter, 225 P.3d 610 (Colo. 
2010); In re Interrogatories of Ritter, 227 P.3d 892 (Colo. 2010). 
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by-state limits, a detailed 2013 study by Joanna Shepherd concluded that 
total business contributions were much higher in states with elections, 
and especially in those with partisan elections.82 For both individual and 
organization contributions, limits are irrelevant for those states that have 
no campaigns for supreme court because the voters play no role whatso-
ever in the selection or retention process. But for those states with judi-
cial selection or retention elections, it is significant that statutes in 19 
states allow organizations—especially PACs—to contribute $5,000 or 
more to supreme court campaign committees, and 22 states permit indi-
viduals (often lawyers) to contribute $5,000 or more. Those numbers 
represent a majority of states that include the voters in determining who 
serves on their highest appellate bench. And the three states that allow 
the largest contributions from organizations—Illinois, Texas, and Ohio—
all use partisan elections for the initial selection of their supreme court 
justices. Contributions of $5,000 are readily noticed by judicial candi-
dates.  
Most codes of judicial conduct follow the ABA model rule prohibit-
ing them from personally soliciting or accepting campaign contribu-
tions.83 However, as former candidates for supreme court positions, the 
authors are both familiar with the fund raising process.84 Our experience 
is that while justices might not know precisely who has contributed to 
their campaign committees, or how much, it is difficult to avoid know-
ing, from public endorsements and from attendance at fund raisers 
(which the candidates politely leave before money is requested), the 
types of lawyers and interest groups that seem ready to help out.85   
                                                                                                                        
 82 Joanna Shepherd, Justice at Risk: An Empirical Analysis of Cam-
paign Contributions and Judicial Decisions, AM. CONST. SOC’Y 10–11 (June 
2013), 
http://www.acslaw.org/ACS%20Justice%20at%20Risk%20(FINAL)%206_10_1
3.pdf [https://perma.cc/XFZ3-4JQ2]. 
 83 MODEL CODE R. 4.1(A)(8). 
 84 Author Philip A. Talmadge was elected to the Washington State Su-
preme Court in 1994, serving from 1995-2001. Hugh D. Spitzer was an unsuc-
cessful candidate for the Washington State Supreme Court in 1998.  
 85 The practical difficulty of shielding judicial candidates from the 
identities of their contributors is discussed in FLAMM, supra note 77, at 154–57. 
Flamm points out that by attending fundraisers, a judicial candidate “cannot 
help but learn the identity of the contributors” and that because candidates often 
must sign campaign disclosure documents as to their accuracy, “the ethical pro-
visions designed to screen judges from their contributors are, as a practical mat-
ter, unenforceable.” Id., at 190. Indeed, as the authors are aware from their re-
spective judicial campaigns, Model Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 4.1(A)(7) 
prohibits judicial candidates from personally soliciting campaign funds, and 
most candidates leave the room when solicitations are made and conscientiously 
avoid learning the identity of contributors. Yet state elections law requires the 
candidates to certify disclosure information to state election authorities, includ-
ing the identities of in-kind contributors, pledges, and corrections in the identi-
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B. The ABA’s Unsuccessful Attempt to Limit Contributions Through 
Model Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 4.4(B)(1) 
In 1998, the American Bar Association’s Task Force on Lawyers’ 
Political Contributions recommended, among other things, that the Mod-
el Code of Judicial Conduct be amended to limit the amount of money 
that a judicial candidate’s committee could accept from any specific 
lawyer, firm, or organization.86 The following year, the ABA House of 
Delegates amended the Model Code to add a provision establishing cap-
ping both individual and entity campaign contributions at amounts to be 
determined on a state-by-state basis.87 The 2007 revision to the Model 
Code placed these recommended limits at Rule 4.4((B)(1), which cur-
rently reads: 
(B) A judicial candidate subject to public election shall 
direct his or her campaign committee: 
(1) to solicit and accept only such campaign 
contributions* as are reasonable, in any event 
not to exceed, in the aggregate,* $[insert 
amount] from any individual or $[insert amount] 
from any entity or organization; 
The concept is for each state adopting the Model Code to consider inclu-
sion of aggregate limits from individuals and organizations that are seen 
by the rule promulgators as being “reasonable in amount, appropriate 
under the circumstances, and in conformity with applicable law.”88 A 
similar Model Code provision, at Rule 2.11(A)(4), would require the 
disqualification of judges where a party or lawyer appearing before that 
judge has made aggregate campaign contributions of a specified amount 
within a specified time period.89 
                                                                                                                        
ties of contributors or amounts donated. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 390-16-041 
(2017). 
 86 GILLERS ET AL., supra note 37, at 690. 
 87 Former MODEL CODE R. 5(C)(3). The 1999 amendments are availa-
ble at Model 
Code of Judicial Conduct: Canon 5, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/group
s/professional_responsibility/publications/model_code_of_judicial_conduct/mo
del_code_of_judicial_conduct_canon_5.html [https://perma.cc/T6NS-FNHV]. 
 88 MODEL CODE   R. 4.4(C)(3). The 2007 adjustments to the rule also 
added language to that comment to the effect that a candidate “should be espe-
cially cautious in connection with such contributions, so they do not create 
grounds for disqualification if the candidate is elected to judicial office.” 
CHARLES G. GEYH & W. WILLIAM HODES, REPORTERS’ NOTES TO THE ABA 
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 113 (2008). 
 89 MODEL CODE R. 2.11(A)(4) states that a judge must disqualify him-
self or herself when his or her impartiality might reasonably be questioned, in-
cluding when: “(4) The judge knows or learns by means of a timely motion that 
a party, a party’s lawyer, or the law firm of a party’s lawyer has within the pre-
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But the ABA’s attempt to promote contribution limits in codes of ju-
dicial conduct has been markedly unsuccessful. Although 35 states have 
codes of judicial conduct that reflect many of the ABA’s recommended 
2007 revisions,90 none have in place Rule 4.4((B)(1) language that tracks 
the ABA’s recommended provision. Many either have not adopted Rule 
4.4,91 or have adopted and shortened Rule 4.4(B)(1) so that it admonish-
es judicial campaign committees to “to solicit and accept only such cam-
paign contributions as are reasonable,”92 or, in eleven states,93 to accept 
contributions that do not exceed those permitted by law. Only Ohio’s 
Rule 4.4(H)94 details the maximum amounts that campaign committees 
may accept for various judicial offices, and for the state supreme court 
the limits are relatively high: $7,600 for full election cycle from individ-
uals, $14,000 from organizations, and $537,100 from political parties. 
Michigan, which has not updated its code of judicial conduct, includes 
only one prescribed limit: its Canon 7(B)(2)(C) bans judicial campaign 
committees from soliciting more than $100 from any attorney.95 
Minnesota experimented with Rule 4.4(B)(1), adopting in 2008 a 
version requiring judicial campaign committees “to solicit and accept 
only campaign contributions not to exceed, in the aggregate, $2,000 
from any individual, entity, or organization in an election year and $500 
in a non-election year.”96 That rule was repealed five years later97 after 
                                                                                                                        
vious [insert number] year[s] made aggregate* contributions* to the judge’s 
campaign in an amount that [is greater than $[insert amount] for an individual or 
$[insert amount] for an entity] [is reasonable and appropriate for an individual 
or an entity].” 
 90 See State Adoption of Revised Model Code of Judicial Conduct, 
A.B.A. (2016), 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/resources/judici
al_ethics_regulation/map.html [https://perma.cc/GA77-MKBZ]. 
 91 Id. 
 92 See, e.g., INDIANA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.4 (2011); 
MAINE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.4 (2015); NEBRASKA CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.4 (2011). 
 93 See, e.g., ARIZONA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.4 (2017); 
IDAHO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.4 (2017); IOWA CODE OF JUDICIAL 
CONDUCT R. 4.4 (2010); KANSAS CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.4 (2009); 
MINNESOTA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.4 (2016); MONTANA CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.4 (2014); NEVADA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.4 
(2009); OKLAHOMA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.4 (2010); PENNSYLVANIA 
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.4 (2014); TENNESSEE CODE OF JUDICIAL 
CONDUCT R. 4.4 (2017); WASHINGTON CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.4 
(2011). 
 94 OHIO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.4(H) (2017). 
 95 MICHIGAN CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 7(B)(2)(C) (2016). 
 96 ORDER PROMULGATING REVISED MINNESOTA CODE OF JUDICIAL 
CONDUCT, ADM08-8004 (Dec. 18, 2008). 
 97 ORDER PROMULGATING AMENDMENTS TO THE MINNESOTA CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT, ADM08-8004 (Dec. 31, 2013). 
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the Minnesota legislature amended its campaign finance law to cover 
judicial elections.98 Justice Barry Anderson dissented from the original 
order on the grounds that the state’s Board of Judicial Standards, as a 
judicial ethics board, was ill-equipped to supervise and enforce the rule 
as a type of campaign finance regulatory agency.99 He suggested that 
Minnesota’s Campaign Finance and Public Disclosure Board would be a 
better agency to manage judicial campaign contribution limits.100 Justice 
Anderson’s view ultimately prevailed, and soon after the legislature 
brought judicial campaign contributions under the general statute, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court amended its Rule 4.4(b)(1) so that it now re-
quired judicial candidates to direct their campaign committees “to solicit 
and accept only campaign contributions in an amount allowed by 
law.”101 
It is hard to know why Model Code Rule 4.4(B)(1) has been so un-
successful. Justice Anderson’s reticence about the judiciary overseeing 
campaign practices is a reasonable explanation—at least in those states 
where statutes do set limits on contributions to judicial campaigns. 
Where the only rule requirement is that judicial campaign committees 
must solicit accept only such contributions as are “reasonable,” that rea-
sonableness standard is largely incapable of enforcement. Precisely how 
large a contribution is “unreasonable?” Does it make a difference if the 
candidate is an incumbent who has the benefit of some name familiarity? 
Does it make a difference if the candidate is facing a well-financed op-
ponent or large independently-financed attack ads? One can also specu-
late that because the proposed Rule 4.4(B)(1) does not control independ-
ent expenditures, some justices may wish to keep their powder dry and 
maintain the ability of their committees to raise substantial amounts of 
cash if those justices are targeted by well-funded independent groups. 
These practical concerns are real in the rough and tumble world of cam-
paigns. 
C.    Tighter Disqualification Rules 
Some concerned about the impact of large campaign contributions 
on judicial impartiality (and the appearance of impartiality) advocate for 
stiffer mandatory disqualification rules. The Gibson and Caldeira study, 
                                                                                                                        
 98 Act of May 24, 2013, ch. 138, 2013 Minn. Laws 2353. 
 99 ORDER PROMULGATING AMENDMENTS TO THE MINNESOTA CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT, ADM08-8004, supra note 97, at D-1. 
 100 Id. Before joining the court, Justice Anderson had served on Minne-
sota’s Ethical Practices Board, the predecessor agency of the Campaign Finance 
and Public Disclosure Board. Telephone Interview with Justice Barry Anderson, 
Minnesota Supreme Court (Jan. 30, 2017). 
 101  ORDER PROMULGATING AMENDMENTS TO THE MINNESOTA CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT, ADM08-8004, supra note 97. 
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discussed above,102 concluded that the impact of large contributions on 
the perceived legitimacy of the courts was mitigated, but not entirely 
cured, by strong recusal requirements.103 A recent study by political sci-
entists Banks Miller and Brett Curry104 focused on the impact of a man-
datory disqualification statute in Alabama.105 Miller and Curry concluded 
that the law “played a role in reducing the number of large donations 
from attorneys, business, and parties,”106 but that one response to the 
requirement was simply to shift money from individuals to PACs so that 
“donations do not count against the contribution limit, triggering 
recusal.”107 
In Model Code Rule 2.11(A)(4),108 the ABA has recommended that a 
“judge must disqualify himself or herself when his or her impartiality 
might reasonably be questioned,” including when a party or lawyer has 
contributed more than an amount to be specified in the rule. However, in 
a phenomenon similar to the fate of Model Rule 4.4(B)(1), the ABA’s 
approach to mandatory disqualification has almost completely ignored. 
Again, practical problems intrude. How large a contribution would result 
in a judge’s impartiality being questioned? Is it measured based on the 
percentage of all contributions to the judge’s campaign, or by a hard dol-
lar amount? Based on two national surveys,109 it appears that only Arizo-
                                                                                                                        
 102 See Gibson & Caldeira, supra notes 8, 74, 75 and accompanying 
text. 
 103 See Gibson & Caldeira, supra note 8, at 78. 
 104 Banks Miller & Brett Curry, The Effect of Per Se Recusal Rules on 
Donor Behavior in Judicial Elections, 24 JUSTICE SYS. J. 125 (2013). 
 105 The statute relevant to the Miller and Curry study, ALA. CODE § 12-
24-2, was adopted in 1995 and required supreme court justices to recuse if a 
party or lawyer before them had contributed more than $4,000 during the previ-
ous election cycle. See ALA. CODE § 12-24-2(c). That statute was repealed in 
2014 by Act 2014-455, p. 1688, § 2, after something of a stalemate between the 
state’s Attorney General and the State Supreme Court over enforcement. See 
NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION BASED ON CAMPAIGN 
CONTRIBUTIONS (Nov. 
2016), http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Topics/Center%20for%20Judici
al%20Ethics/Disqualificationcontributions.ashx [https://perma.cc/HU3W-
79ME]. The statute was then replaced by Ala. Laws 2014-455, codified at ALA. 
CODE § 12-24-3. Id. at 2–3. The new approach created a rebuttable presumption 
that the justice or judge should recuse if a contribution during the previous elec-
tion cycle exceeded a specified percentage of all contributions to that jurist’s 
campaign, provided for an appeal if a judge did not recuse. 
 106 See Miller & Curry, supra note 104, at 101. 
 107 See id. at 102. 
 108 See supra note 89. 
 109 A.B.A. CPR Pol’y Implementation Comm., Comparison of ABA 
Model Judicial Code and State Variations, Rule 2.11: Disqualification, (Aug. 
31, 2016), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_respo
108 Virginia Journal of Social Policy & the Law [Vol. 25:2 
na and Utah have adopted Model Code Rule 2.11(A)(4) in a form close 
to that suggested by the ABA, and only four other states (Alabama, Cali-
fornia, Mississippi and New York) have adopted differently worded rules 
mandating recusal when campaign contributions from a party or lawyer 
exceed a specific amount. Based on the same surveys, it seems that every 
other state has either done nothing, or adopted Model Code Rule 2.11 
while deleting Rule 2.11(A)(4), or, in the case of 11 states identified in 
the National Center for State Courts’ study,110 “adopted new disqualifica-
tion rules that do not have specific triggers like the ABA model, but that 
expressly or impliedly incorporate the decision in Caperton.”111 Those 
new rules tend to be fairly general and permissive in character, not at all 
like the mandatory disqualification approach recommended in Model 
Code Rule 2.11(A)(4). 
Law professors Deborah Goldberg, James Sample and David Pozen 
have reviewed the nation’s experience with courts underusing and un-
derenforcing recusals,112 and recommended a number of potential re-
forms including per se disqualification based on high campaign contri-
butions.113 They suggest that the lack of adoption of such a rule can be 
explained by (1) the fact that the rule is unnecessary in states where stat-
utes have already capped donations to all political campaigns,114 and (2) 
the likelihood that parties might try to disqualify a judge by intentionally 
contributing to his or her campaign committee.115 Their solution is a rule 
that would aggregate contributions not just from a single donor but from 
all donors associated with a party to a legal action. They would also 
permit a party to waive disqualification.116 But given the low interest of 
courts in adopting any contribution caps, it is unlikely that these recom-
mendations would be adopted. Goldberg, Sample and Pozen recommend 
several other approaches, including, among others, peremptory disquali-
fications, independent determinations on disqualification motions, and 
improved mechanisms for replacing disqualified appellate judges.117  
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Perhaps the best explanation for the resistance of courts to impose 
tough disqualification rules on themselves is that judges seem to think—
rightly or wrongly—that they can resist pressures and preconceptions 
and remain impartial most of the time. With respect to political pressures 
and campaign contributions, this is borne out by a study on disqualifica-
tions by the American judicature Society, which showed that compared 
to other bases for disqualification, relatively few judges saw “political 
reasons” and campaign donations as posing difficult disqualification 
choices.118 As a state supreme court justice remarked to one of this es-
say’s authors, many judges reject tight recusal mandates based on politi-
cal contributions because they feel that a rule like this “suggests that 
people thought they could be bought.”119 
D. Public Financing of Judicial Campaigns 
Still another proposed solution to the influx of special interest mon-
ey in judicial election campaigns is to shift to public funding for those 
candidates who agree to tight spending limits. A number of public fi-
nancing approaches have been proposed, including offering refunds or 
tax credits to contributors, matching private donations to campaigns, free 
television time on public channels like C-SPAN, added space in official 
voter pamphlets, and providing grants to candidates once they raise a 
minimum amount in small private donations.120 The argument for this 
approach is that, if funded generously enough, it can detach judicial can-
didates from their reliance on special interest groups and allow them to 
compete even when their opponents are receiving large donations or in-
dependent expenditures. But for those who wish to discourage contested 
judicial elections, a downside of a robust public funding program is that 
that the availability of funds might encourage challengers.121 On the oth-
er hand, this assistance would be available to challengers, too, counter-
acting the argument that judicial campaign limits are protective of in-
cumbents. 
Whatever the pros and cons of public financing of judicial cam-
paigns, this approach to the influence of big money has not taken off—
indeed, only 13 states have some type of public funding for non-judicial 
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races,122 and only four have attempted this mechanism in court cam-
paigns. Wisconsin’s program, begun in 1977,123 was first under-funded 
and then entirely defunded in Governor Scott Walker’s 2011 budget.124 
Notwithstanding the evidence that North Carolina’s public financing 
program changed judges’ behavior on the bench and made them less fa-
vorable to attorney donors,125 that state’s legislature demolished that 
state’s popular system in 2013.126 
Today, only New Mexico and West Virginia have public financing in 
place for supreme court candidates.127 West Virginia’s program went into 
effect after the Massey Coal contributions to a state judicial campaign 
first came to light,128 and it provides up to a $525,000s in public support 
for candidates who raise a sufficient number of contributions under 
$250.129 But the existence of public money for judicial candidates cam-
paign committees has apparently done little to stem to the flow of large 
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independent expenditures in that state’s judicial elections.130 New Mexi-
co’s program began in 2007,131 and it was updated in 2013, which wit-
nessed the first appellate judge elected with his campaign almost entirely 
financed with public funding.132 But that state’s public funding program 
is facing budget challenges, and it remains to be seen if it will be suc-
cessful on a long term basis.133  
Finally, one of the most promising types of public campaign funding 
mechanisms—increased public money for candidates facing attacks from 
large independent expenditures—was ruled unconstitutional in Arizona 
Free Enterprise v. Bennett,134 a case involving public financing of execu-
tive and legislative races in Arizona. In Arizona Free Enterprise, Chief 
Justice Roberts held for a 5-4 majority that the increased public funds to 
match outside expenditures violated the First Amendment because it 
could result in the suppression of expenditures by those outside groups135 
(which is of course the whole point).136  
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In summary, the small number of states participating in public fi-
nancing of judicial campaigns, and the ups and downs of funding for 
those programs, suggests that the success of this approach is yet to be 
determined. But Morgan Hazelton’s recent North Carolina study137 sug-
gests that public funding makes a difference in how judges vote in spe-
cific cases, reducing their proclivity to side with donating attorneys and 
moving them to more ideologically moderate stances in their opinions. 
IV. WHAT IS TO BE DONE? 
In this section we, suggest an array of actions that state courts and 
legislatures can take if they are serious about spending controls in 
judicial elections. As noted above, not all judges are willing to get tough 
on this issue138 or on the issue of mandatory disqualification from cases 
involving major donors.139 But if jurists and legislators are serious about 
reducing the influx of money into judicial elections, there definitely are 
things they can do about it. Exercising their inherent judicial powers, 
courts can establish both tight campaign contribution limits and 
corresponding mandatory disqualification requirements. Below, we also 
present an argument for the constitutionality of state legislation 
controlling campaign expenditures and independent expenditures in the 
narrow area of judicial elections. Finally, states can establish public 
campaign funding systems for court races. 
Two of our recommendations are based on the widely-recognized 
power of the courts—typically the supreme courts--to regulate the 
judicial branch,140 particularly where necessary to preserve the integrity 
and independence of the judiciary and to protect public confidence in the 
administration of justice.141 This includes the authority to “regulate 
election activities of its members and potential members”142 and to 
require recusal when the probability of bias is too high.143 As discussed 
below, our other two recommendations require legislative action because 
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they involve controls over persons outside the control of the judicial 
branch. 
A. Using the Code of Judicial Conduct to Install Contribution 
Limits 
In states where a supreme court concludes that the statutory 
framework does not adequately limit donations to judicial campaigns, we 
recommend that state supreme courts should act forcefully to impose 
strict caps on contributions to judicial campaigns, using the mechanism 
suggested by the American Bar Association’s Model Code of Judicial 
Conduct, Rule 4.4(B)(1). We suggest a cap of $2,000 per individual or 
organizational contributor per election cycle. We see this as an amount 
that is a reasonable compromise among the variety of levels set by states 
that have any limits at all. As described above,144 of the 37 states where 
voters play a role in selecting supreme court justices, three states cap 
individual contributions at $1,000, and another seven allow contributions 
between $1,000 and $5,000. Five states have set a $1,000 maximum for 
entity contributions, and six between $1,000 and $5,000. 10 states have 
no individual contribution maximum at all, and another 17 states cap 
donations at $5,000 or higher. The lack of relatively tight contribution 
limits means that those latter states are more susceptible to an influx of 
campaign cash, and according to the political scientists this can affect 
both impartiality and the appearance of fair courts. 
Many justices might dislike a $2,000 maximum because it means 
that they, along with their campaign committees, will be forced to work 
much harder to collect a large number of small donations rather than a 
small number of big donations. But that’s the point. If it is harder to raise 
campaign cash, then less cash will be spent by campaigns. Justices might 
also be concerned that these caps could put them at a disadvantage in the 
face of large independent expenditures for an opponent or a swarm of 
attack ads. Below, we suggest a solution to that problem, i.e., by 
legislative limits on independent expenditures in judicial races (and only 
in judicial races). Justices like Minnesota’s Barry Anderson145 have a 
legitimate argument that courts are not as institutionally qualified as 
election commissions to collect campaign data and oversee donations. 
But if the legislators refuse to cap campaign contributions to judicial 
campaigns, or if those caps are too high (i.e., above $2,000 in our view), 
then the courts need to step up and do the job. That job will be easier by 
virtue of the fact that most of the states with no contribution limits do 
have mandatory campaign reporting systems in place, so that court 
administrators (and candidates’ campaigns) can quickly identify 
instances of donations exceeding the limits imposed by that state’s Rule 
4.4(B)(1). 
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We also recommend that courts expressly bring under the control of 
Rule 4.4(B)(1), those outside expenditures that are prearranged or 
coordinated with judicial campaigns—this appears to be acceptable 
under Buckley v. Valeo.146 So long as the expenditures are not fully 
independent, they are appropriately treated as part of the campaigns so 
that those expenditures can be limited to $2,000. 
B. Corresponding Mandatory Disqualification Rules 
As a companion to campaign contribution limits, state supreme 
courts should adopt the mandatory disqualification mechanism in the 
ABA’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 2.11(A).147 Our 
recommendation is that disqualification should be required where an 
attorney or party before a judge has contributed more than $2,000 to that 
jurist’s (or an opponent’s) election campaign during the preceding 
election cycle. In jurisdictions in which a supreme court or the 
legislature has capped contributions at $2,000, the disqualification 
requirement will rarely be needed, and will simply serve as a double 
protection against oversized contributions. But in states with higher 
contribution limits or none at all, the disqualification requirement will 
provide an important check on campaign spending—and an effective 
one, according to researchers.148  
At the same time, mandatory disqualification could cause a shift of 
donations from candidates’ campaigns to independent PACs that launch 
attacks against a candidate.149 Consequently, we urge state supreme 
courts to broaden Rule 2.11(A) of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct to 
include independent expenditures. That rule could require 
disqualification of a judge when there is verifiable information150 that a 
party before her has contributed more than $2,000 to an independent 
entity that paid for advertisements supporting or attacking her during the 
previous election cycle. We considered a recommendation that judges 
recuse themselves on issues on which independent organizations spent 
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substantial amounts attacking or supporting those judges. But such a rule 
would be difficult to implement, and in any event, we believe that it is 
legitimate to support or oppose judicial candidates based on their legal 
philosophy or broad approach to legal issues. For example, if an 
independent group were to spend $100,000 criticizing a judge during a 
campaign for being unfairly harsh on criminal defendants, it would not 
make sense for that judge, upon reelection, to be required to recuse 
himself from every criminal case. Other provisions of the Code of 
Judicial Conduct, such as Rule 2.2, can be relied upon to ensure that the 
judge continues to be impartial and fair. But there are other methods, 
which we next discuss, that can provide tighter controls on independent 
expenditures in court races. 
C. Bucking Buckley: Limits on Judicial Campaign and Independent 
Expenditures 
The key to controlling the level of spending in judicial campaigns is 
a mechanism limiting independent expenditures as well as total spending 
by campaigns. Yet both of these were ruled out in Buckley v. Valeo,151 at 
least for political races. Buckley applied a “closely drawn” test for limits 
on campaign speech,152 and that has since evolved towards standard 
“strict scrutiny” approach in cases like White153 and McCutcheon.154 
However, we contend that judicial elections present a special circum-
stance that justify greater restrictions than are permitted in campaigns for 
policy-making positions, and that even the strict scrutiny standard can be 
satisfied. It is important to note that the Buckley decision concluded that 
independent campaign expenditures did not “presently appear to pose 
dangers of real or apparent corruption. . . .”155 Perhaps that was the case 
in 1976, but the research shows that those expenditures do pose real 
dangers today in the judicial election context. Based on the Supreme 
Court’s willingness in Caperton and Williams-Yulee to go to greater 
lengths to protect judicial impartiality and public confidence in the fair-
ness of the courts,156 we suggest that a strong case can be made that a 
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compelling interest exists for greater restrictions on expenditures (“fi-
nancial speech”) in judicial campaigns. Our view is supported by recent 
circuit court opinions sustaining various restrictions on judicial candi-
dates.157 
First, it should be emphasized that because of society’s interest in 
protecting the integrity of the judiciary and public confidence in the 
courts, judges are universally expected to give up certain rights that are 
possessed by others in the community. For example, while most 
individuals can speak out publicly about others’ race, religion or national 
origin (including quite outrageous things), judges are almost entirely 
constrained in this respect.158 Ordinary citizens have a right to be rude, 
but judges must “be patient, dignified, and courteous.”159 Jurists are 
limited in their ex parte communications with litigants and lawyers.160 
When disciplining trial court Judge Wilbur Malthesius for publicly 
criticizing other judges and inappropriately authoring a letter to the local 
newspaper, New Jersey’s Supreme Court stated:161  
In accepting that appointment, New Jersey judges also 
accept restrictions on personal conduct that might be 
viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and 
should do so freely and willingly. Some of these 
restrictions are of constitutional dimension. . . . Some of 
those restrictions may otherwise abridge a private 
person’s free speech rights. But, by his own choice, 
Judge Mathesius is not a private person. He is a judge. 
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In suspending Judge Solomon Osborne for making racist remarks in 
public, Mississippi’s Supreme Court wrote:162 
No one is compelled to serve as a judge, but once an 
individual offers himself or herself for service, that 
individual accepts the calling with full knowledge of 
certain limitations upon speech and actions in order to 
serve the greater good. A calling to public service is not 
without sacrifice, including the acceptance of limitations 
on constitutionally granted privileges. 
These speech restrictions on judges are typical, unremarkable, and 
extend to their involvement in the political realm as well. In 
reprimanding a state district court judge for posting a sign supporting the 
county sheriff’s reelection, Iowa’s Supreme Court held:163 
The strength of our judicial system is due in large part to 
its independence and neutrality. . . . These twin qualities 
help remove outside influences from judicial decision-
making, and promote public respect and confidence in 
our system of justice. Yet, judicial independence does 
not come without some personal sacrifice by judges. 
Judicial independence and neutrality require judges to 
limit or abstain from involvement in a variety of 
activities commonly enjoyed by others in the 
community, including politics. 
Justice Scalia, in White, concluded that a judicial candidate’s mere 
statement about a legal issue did not sufficiently serve the need to 
preserve impartiality for or against a party, or its appearance, contending 
that no one expects judges to be without some preconceptions about the 
law.164 Notwithstanding Justice Scalia’s view, and despite the robust 
campaign finance protections for ordinary political candidates in 
Buckley165 and McCutcheon,166 the Supreme Court has taken a different 
approach in judicial campaign finance cases. In Caperton, a majority 
recognized that a litigant’s contribution of $3 million to alter the West 
Virginia supreme court’s composition caused a risk of actual bias, not to 
speak of the fact that two-thirds of the state’s voters did not believe that 
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the successful candidate could be impartial.167 Justice Kennedy 
concluded that due process required “an objective inquiry into whether 
the contributor’s influence on the election . . . ‘would offer a possible 
temptation to the average . . . judge to . . . lead him not to hold the 
balance nice, clear and true.’”168 In Williams-Yulee, Chief Justice 
Roberts’ opinion for the Court emphasized that judges “are not 
politicians,”169 and that a rule prohibiting judicial candidates from 
personally soliciting funds was supported by the “compelling interest in 
preserving public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary.”170 Roberts 
added that states may appropriately conclude “that the public may lack 
confidence in a judge’s ability to administer justice without fear or favor 
if he comes to office by asking for favors.”171 He noted that personal 
solicitation by a judicial candidate puts those solicited in a position to 
fear retaliation if they do not contribute, and that potential litigants 
would then fear that the integrity of the judicial system was 
compromised:172 “A State’s decision to elect its judges does not require it 
to tolerate these risks. The Florida Bar’s interest is compelling.”173 
If the Supreme Court has concluded that the appearance of 
impartiality is materially damaged by a candidate simply asking for 
favors, then the Court should similarly conclude that in the judicial 
election context, a state has a compelling interest to reduce or curtail the 
actual receipt of favors in the form of campaign cash. As described 
above, the public firmly believes that judicial contributions affect judges’ 
decision-making,174 so the appearance of impartiality is patently affected 
by campaign donations by litigants, attorneys, and special interest 
groups. Even more important is the empirical research demonstrating 
that judges are in fact more impartial when they are not dependent on 
private campaign contributors or when those judges are subject to 
mandatory recusal rules.175 
The Supreme Court recognized in Caperton and in Williams-Yulee 
that judicial elections are fundamentally different from elections for 
political posts, and that the need for judicial independence and 
impartiality may provide a compelling interest for restrictions that would 
not be legally acceptable with respect to political candidates. 
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2018] Judicial Campaigns 119 
Notwithstanding Buckley and McCutcheon, we believe that the Court 
might well uphold a code of judicial conduct provision capping total 
judicial campaign expenditures, and/or a state law or court rule 
prohibiting or limiting independent expenditures on judicial campaigns. 
We contend that one or more state supreme courts should impose tight 
judicial campaign expenditure limits, and one or more legislatures—or 
the courts themselves—should enact statutes curtailing independent 
expenditures in judgeship races.  
Some might argue that legislative action is required to govern 
independent campaign contributions because the courts (and their 
rulemaking authority) have limited control over contributors who are 
outside the judicial branch, i.e., contributors other than judges and 
attorneys. However, we assert that massive judicial campaign 
contributions and expenditures pose such a serious threat to judicial 
independence and the public’s confidence in the justice system, that state 
supreme courts have sufficient inherent authority to impose strict judicial 
campaign expenditure limits and limits on outside independent spending 
in court races. Notwithstanding legislative assertions to the contrary, 
state high courts have long asserted and exercised inherent powers to 
safeguard the judicial branch, including those powers “essential to the 
existence, dignity, and functions” of the judicial system.176 In protecting 
and overseeing the judiciary, courts across the country have long 
assumed control of rulemaking,177 the admission and discipline of 
attorneys,178 the management and regulation of the judicial system 
(including judges and staff),179 and, controversially, the mandatory 
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provision of funds to support the judicial branch when lack of adequate 
funding threatens the viability of the courts.180 Although some have 
contended that by taking these self-protective actions judges have 
pushed their way into policy-making that ought to reside in 
legislatures,181 strong inherent judicial powers have been firmly 
established in most states.182 In our view, if a state supreme court 
concludes that its legislature has failed to enact adequate controls over 
judicial campaign expenditures and outside contributions, and the court 
concludes that the lack of adequate contribution and spending limits 
endangers the judiciary, that court has sufficient authority to impose 
those controls by court rule. Attached in Appendix [A] is a suggested 
court rule implementing those limits. Although a rule such as the one we 
recommend might face a First Amendment challenge, we believe that 
there are solid arguments for upholding a judicially-imposed 
regulation.183 
D. Moving Ahead with Public Funding. 
Our final recommendation is that state legislatures move forward 
with the adoption of public funding systems for judicial campaigns. 
Although lawmakers have pulled back from such programs for financial 
reasons,184 the research suggests that they are effective in promoting 
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impartial decision-making185 and improving public perceptions of 
judicial fairness.186 If controls on independent expenditures are added to 
existing limits on donations to judicial campaigns, the cost of court 
elections will remain at modest levels and public financing systems 
should not present a substantial budget hurdle. 
Further, if the Supreme Court is willing to accept that states have a 
compelling interest in preserving judicial impartiality (and its 
appearance) such that they can control total campaign expenditures and 
independent spending, then the Court should similarly permit public 
funding programs for judicial elections to use the matching mechanism 
that was not permitted for political elections in Bennett,187 i.e., increasing 
the public funding for a judicial campaign as outside expenditures 
against a candidate (or for an opponent) increase. Again, a state’s interest 
in assuring the public that justice cannot be bought, and preventing the 
actual purchase of justice, provides a compelling interest that might not 
exist in the context of executive and legislative races. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In 1215, King John’s barons, clearly a special interest group with 
substantial resources, were so upset about the influence of money and 
power on the courts that they forced the king to promise: “To no one will 
we sell, to no one deny or delay right or justice.“188 In our view, the 
political scientists’ findings on the direct and material impact of judicial 
campaign cash on judges’ behavior and public confidence in the courts, 
provide the compelling interest for state courts and legislatures to take 
action. In the spirit of Magna Carta’s commitment to impartial courts, 
courts and legislatures should install much stronger controls on 
donations to judicial campaigns, total campaign expenditures, and 
independent spending on court races. The social scientists’ findings also 
provide an adequate basis for public funding for judicial elections. The 
universally recognized need to ensure judges’ impartiality and the 
appearance of fairness also provides a constitutionally-acceptable basis 
for much more robust controls and programs than are permitted in non-
judicial elections. We hope that state supreme courts and legislatures will 
step up to the challenge. 
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